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Judith Marie Kubicki

Using J. L. Austin's Performative Language Theory
to Interpret Ritual Music-Making
Both scholars and practitioners of liturgy generally agree that one
of the foundational principles underlying the reforms promulgated byVatican II's Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy' is the importance of the active participation of the faithful in the liturgy.
However, what is not always so clear, thirty-five years later, is what
the active participation of the faithful actually involves and what
best promotes the possibility of it actually happening.
The singing of acclamations, hymns, and other forms of ritual
music has long been promoted as an effective means for providing
a worshiping assembly with the opportunity to participate actively
in the liturgy. While experience may have validated this assumption on some levels, questions continue to be raised regarding
music's role in ritual prayer. These include questions regarding
whether music contributes more than simply" a nobler aspect" to
the rites or "a more graceful expression to prayer,'" and why and
how music can be described as integral or ministerial to worship.'
Other areas of concern focus on questions of excellence and appropriateness.
The approach which I have taken to examining music's role in
the liturgy begins with a consideration of the liturgy as a dynamic

1

complexus of symbols which are not objects, but actions that
negotiate and/or disclose relationships.' Within the ritual we can
liturgy, music can be described as one of many symbols within that
dynamic complexus of symbols. If symbols require that we approach them as dynamic rather than static realities, then it followS
that the proper object for the study of music as ritual symbol is not
the music printed on the page of a hymnal nor captured on compact disc, but the action of music-making. Such a focus would shift
the primary concern from the music itself and place it instead on
the activity of human subjects as music-makers. Such a focus need
not deny the importance of using quality music in ritual musicmaking. Rather, it could better contextualize that concern and require an anthropological basis for setting up criteria of excellence.
Several recent documents on ritual music, notably Universa
Laus's "De la Musique dans les Liturgies Chretiennes," refer to
music as a "symbolic practice:" thereby highlighting an understanding of ritual music as activity. Similarly, the Ten Year Report
published by the Milwaukee Symposia for Church Composers
describes Christian liturgy as a symbolic event and symbol itself as
a dynamic rather than a static reality.'
In my own research, I have adopted a musical hermeneutic proposed by the philosopher Lawrence Kramer. Interpreting music,
explains Kramer, requires opening a musical work's available hermeneutic windows and treating it as a field of humanly significant
action.' His hermeneutic is based on the conviction that although
4 Nathan
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1See articles 11, 14, and 113 as significant examples of the importance given to
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2 Sacred Congregation of Rites, HMusicam Sacram," in Ada Apostolicae Sedis 60
(1967) 5. In this article the English translation is taken from Documents on the
Liturgy 1963-1979: Conciliar, Papal, and Curial Texts (Collegeville: The Liturgical
Press 1982). Hereafter MS and DOL.
31 address these questions more fully in my dissertation, #Jacques Berthier's
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Publications 1992).
7 Lawrence Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900 (Berkeley: University
of California Press 1990) 6.
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music does not make propositions, it does have referential power.
In order to discover the possible meanings to which a particular
piece of music may be referring, we need to approach it with the
assumption that it resists fully disclosing itself. While the music
does not give itself immediately to understanding, it can be made
to yield to understanding if we are able to open hermeneutic
windows through which our understanding can pass.'
Kramer identifies three types of hermeneutic windows available
for interpreting music. They number textual inclusions, citational
inclusions, and structural tropes. Textual inclusions refer to texts
set to music, titles, epigrams, program notes, and sometimes
expression marking. Citational inclusions refer to various literary,
visual, musical, and historical allusions.' It was the third hermeneutic window, however, what Kramer calls strnctural tropes, that
highlights the activity of music-making. By strnctural trope Kramer
means"a structural procedure, capable of various practical realizations, that also functions as a typical expressive ad [emphasis
added] within a certain cultural/historical framework."lO According
to Kramer, structural tropes are the most powerful type of
hermeneutic window. He understands them as units of doing
rather than of saying [emphasis added] that can evolve from any
aspect of communicative exchange: style, rhetoric, representations,
etc. By describing the performance of music as an expressive act,
we are focusing on the doing of something rather than the saying
of something.
Since ritual is a combination of both" articulate speech and purposeful action,"" an approach which views ritual language as action can provide a framework for interpreting music-making as an
example of ritual speech acts. J. L. Austin's performative language
theory provides an important perspective on ritua/language because it is built on the premise that, in certain instances, language
as action takes precedence over language as assertion. This insight
is important for investigating ritual music's power to generate
meaning because it prOvides the possibility of locating meaning in
SIbid.
9 Ibid., 9-10.
10

Ibid.

Wade T. Wheelock, #The Problem of Ritual Language: From Information to
Situation," The Journal of the American Academy a/Religion 50 (1982) 50.
11
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articulations other than assertions Or truth claims. For if, as Kramer
asserts, meaning begins with-that is, forms around or clings to a truth claim - whether that claim be implicit or explicit, real or
fictive - then music has no meaning in the ordinary sense.12 If,
however, meaning can be found, not only in a grid of assertions,
but embedded in "a field of humanly significant actions,"" then
there is the possibility of using performative language theory to
locate meaning in ritual music-making.
APPROACHING MUSIC AS A TYPE OF LANGUAGE

Before using performative language theory to interpret music, it is
important to justify the possibility of approaching music as a type
of language. Jean-Jacques Nattiez has observed that "since music
is not, after all, language in the literal sense, the use of linguistic
theory in musicology is always metaphorical, so that its value is
heuristic. . . ."14
Justin London has used speech act analysis to interpret musical
structures as compositional utterances made by composers. He
argues that, "as a result of our enculturated belief that music is a
kind of language, we can and often do treat music as a linguistic
phenomenon. That is, we acquire our mechanisms for dealing with
intentional communicative behavior through our acquisition of a
linguistic framework."" In other words, London believes that it is
possible to use speech act analysis to interpret music because language is the prototypical framework we have adopted in order to
deal with other kinds of meaningful communicative behavior."
London explains that it is possible to describe musical structures
in terms of language and linguistic behavior because a MUSIC IS
LANGUAGE metaphor structures the actions a listener performs
in apprehending music. As long as this metaphor is operative, it is
Kramer, 5.
Ibid., 6.
14Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Fondements d'une semiologie de la musique (Paris: Union
12

13

Generale d'Editions 1975) 400. Cited in Francis Sparshott, "Aesthetics of Music,"
in What Is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music, ed. Philip Alperson
(University Paik, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1987) 79·
15Justin London, #Musical and Linguistic Speech Acts," The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism 54 (Wmler 1996) 49.
16 Ibid
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possible to treat a composer and his or her works in the same way
in which we would treat a speaker and his or her utterances.17 This
metaphor, London explains, is acquired in musical childhood and
becomes so established in the way a person learns to listen to music
that it becomes wholly transparent. As a result, a person takes his
or her knowledge structure of language and maps it onto a musical
target. However, the listener is unaware of the fact that the MUSIC
IS LANGUAGE metaphor functions as a basic conceptual metaphor since this type of metaphor is shared by members of a culture
and usually used unconsciously and automatically."
One of the advantages of the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor
is that it allows us to evaluate musical gestures as we would
linguistic gestures. London's study focuses on recovering the composer's intent in choosing a particular musical gesture in a particular musical context. In my own work, I have adopted London's
notion of the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor in order to be able
to interpret music-making in the liturgy as "speech acts" in light of
the performative language theory of J. L. Austin.
J. L. AUSTIN'S PERFORMATIVE LANGUAGE THEORY

Fundamental Principles. In his book, How to Do Things with Words,
the British philosopher, J. L. Austin, offers a key insight when he
points out that the uttering of a sentence can be the doing of an
action." Initially, Austin made distinctions between statements
that represented a situation and those which effected a situation.
According to his theory, every speech act consists of a "locutionary
act," an Hillocutionary act," and a ""'perlocutionary act." The first is
the simple production of an utterance; the second is the effect the
17 Ibid., 49-50. Throughout his essay, London types all phrases referring to
metaphors in capitals according to the notation used by George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson in such works as Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press 1980); and More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 1989). When speaking of metaphor, London does not

mean the figure of speech which can be described as an abbreviated simile.
Rather, he views ordinary thinking and acting as fundamentally metaphorical.
IS Ibid., 51. Examples London offers to support his thesis include such common
statements as NThe principle theme is stated in the violins" and #The flute
answers the questioning oboe."
19John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1962) 5.
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speaker intends the utterance to produce in the hearer; and the
third is the actual effect the sentence has on the hearer. Later in his
career, Austin came to see that all utterances have a performative
aspect. In other words, the speaking of a sentence is the doing of
an action. 20
While subsequent philosophers have further nuanced Austin's
categories and distinctions, they are in general agreement that
there is a category of utterances which not only says something
but actually does something in the saying. Such a conclusion has
significant ramifications for ritual studies. In the first place, it acknowledges the fact that the purpose of language goes beyond the
simple utterance of propositions which can be proven true or false.
Secondly, it provides a framework for looking at the function of
liturgical language in a new way.
Further Developments. In his own research and analysiS, G. J.
Warnock nuanced Austin's performative language theory by saying that "sometimes saying is doing."21 Distinguishing those cases
which count as doing from those which do not depends on conventions in virtue of which saying counts as doing. These conventions are extra-linguistic. 22
John Searle continued to develop the work begun by J. L. Austin
by focusing on the absolute centrality of the concept of the speech
act in the analysis of language. For Searle, the unit of linguistic
communication is not the symbol or word or sentence, but "the
production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the
performance of the speech act."23 Furthermore, Searle reaffirms
Austin's point that it is the illocutionary force of an utterancelanguage's power to produce the intended effect in the act of
speaking - that is the most important concept for analyzing
speech acts.
In analyzing the illocutionary force in speech acts, John Searle
makes some important distinctions. He explains that each
sentence has a propositional indicator and an illocutionary force
"'Wheelock, 52-53·
21 Geoffrey James Warnock, "Some Types of Performative Utterance," in Essays
on J. L. Austin, ed. Isaiah Berlin, et al. (London: Oxford University Press 1973) 69·
22 Ibid., 73.
"John R Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1969) 16.
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indicator. It is the iIlocutionary force indicator with which he is
concerned in looking at statements as speech acts. He explains
that the iIlocutionary force indicator shows what iIlocutionary act
the speaker is performing in uttering the sentence. He lists as devices which serve as these iIlocutionary force indicators the following: word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood
of the verb, and the so-called performative verbs. He adds that
often the context of the actual speech situations makes the iIlocutionary force clear without invoking it explicitly. For example, a
speaker's tone of voice may give his statement the force of a warning, without his having to begin by saying, "I warn you . . .""
Elsewhere Searle reiterates this point in another way when he
says: "The principle that the meaning of a sentence is entirely
determined by the meanings of its meaningful parts I take as obviously true; what is not so obviously true, however, is that these include more than words (or morphemes) and surface word-order.
The meaningful components of a sentence include also its deep
syntactic structure and the stress and intonation contour of its utterance. Words and word-order are not the only elements which
determine meaning" (emphasis added).25
To summarize John Searle's point, performative language theory
acknowledges that in certain instances utterances possess what
has been termed "iIlocutionary force," the power to effect what is
being stated. This force is produced not simply by the words or the
word order, but also by deep syntactic structure, stress, and
intonation-contour.
Lastly, Jacques Derrida's critique of Austin's speech act theory
provides a decisive corrective when he points out that all acts of
communication presuppose the possibility of being repeated in
new contexts. In other words, in order to function at all, a speech
act must be iterable. This means that the speech act is capable of
functioning in situations other than the occasion of its production,
among persons other than those involved in its original production. 26
Ibid'f 30 .
25John R. Seader #Austin on Locutionary and illocutionary Acts,'1' in Essays on J.
24

L. Austin/ 15I.
26 Kramer, 8. See also Jacques Derrida, Margins oj Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: The Chicago University Press 1982) 307-30. Stanley Fish also discusses
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This focus on the iterability or repeatability of all acts of communication is pertinent to an analysis of ritual performance since, by
its very nature ritual is behavior which displays observable repetition in its structural and chronological framework." In addition, by
its nature ritual involves communicating some message by means
of a dynamic interaction of several symbol systems. Within this
context, ritual communication, whether it be in the form of speaking, singing, or gesturing is intimately and essentially connected
with the action context of the ritual. As a result, ritual activity becomes not just an instrument for conveying ideas, but a means to
accomplish the ends of the ritual. That is, ritual performance is an
instance when saying something counts as doing because by its
nature ritual includes those extra-linguistic conventions which
enable saying to count as doing."
Implications for Liturgical Language. Before using performative
language theory as a tool for interpreting liturgical music, it will be
helpful to examine efforts which have already been made to interpret liturgical language using J. L. Austin's theory. Liturgical scholars such as Wade T. Wheelock. Jean Ladriere, and Joseph Schaller
have used performative language theory as an interpretive tool.
Wade T. Wheelock has taken Austin's theory and John Searle's
development of it and applied his conclusions to the study of ritual
language. As a result of his synthesis, Wheelock defines rituallanguage as "that set of utterances which is intimately and essentially
connected with the action context of a ritual. Ritual language is not
just an instrument for conveying ideas, but is directly used in accomplishing the ends of the ritual operation:'"
Wheelock's definition identifies the key distinction between
propositional discourse and ritual language: the first is a locutionary act while the second is an ilIocutionary act. In other words,
propositional discourse is concerned with the production of an
utterance, while ritual language is concerned with the effect the
this at length in his essay "With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on
Austin and Derrida," in Critical Inquiry 8 (1982) 693--'722.
Z7 George S. Worgul, Jr., #Ritual," in The New Dictionary of Sacramental Worship,
ed. Peter E. Fink (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press 1990) 110l.
28Warnock, 73.
29 Wheelock, 50.
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utterance produces. According to Wheelock, the most essential
difference between ritual utterances and ordinary language is the
purpose of the two. On the one hancL the purpose of making a
propositional statement is to communicate information that the
hearer does not already know. Ritual utterances, on the other
hand, are speech acts that convey little or no information. Rather,
they are meant to create and allow participation in a known and
repeatable situation. Instead of information, repetition is the norm
and metaphors and ambiguity abound."
Wheelock reasons that if the conditions governing the performance of a ritual speech act are different from ordinary speech,
then the purpose or illocutionary force of the two must be different. In effect, Wheelock concludes, the language of any ritual must
be primarily understood and described as situating rather than
informing speech. 31
What does Wheelock mean when he says that ritual language is
situating speech? He means that the speaking of the text presents
the situation, expresses and actually helps to create the situation,
and/or facilitates the recognition of the situation. Furthermore,
situating speech has the capacity to constantly repeat the transformations it brings about. Situations represent "being" or "action"
rather than simply knowing. They must and can be concretely
realized at every repetition, since they are the chief means by
which the physical and cultural entities unite in the production of
a situation.32
In his efforts to discover how liturgical language works, Jean
Ladriere has also applied the findings of J. L. Austin and John
Searle to his own linguistic analysis. Ladriere's concern is to discover ways in which linguistic analysis can be used to understand
the expression of Christian faith in liturgy. In order to do so, he
identifies a threefold performativity of liturgical language: that of
existential induction," "'institution:' and presentification."33
H

/I

'" Ibid., 56-59.
3] Ibid., 59.
"Ibid., 5g-<j3.
33 Jean Ladriere, uThe Performativity of Liturgical Language," in Liturgical
Experience afFaith, ed. H. Schmidt and David N. Power, Concilium series, no. 82
(New York: Herder and Herder 1973) 50, 55·
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By existential induction, Ladriere means an operation by means
of which"an expressive form awakens in the person using it a certain affective disposition which opens up existence to a specific
field of reality:'" An effect is produced. The question is what kind
of language function enables it to produce an effect. Ladriere's
explanation is that the function of language is not to indicate the
existence of the attitude nor to describe it, but to speak the attitude.
This is done through the use of personal pronouns and such characteristic performative verbs as "pray" and "give thanks." In other
words, the language makes the attitude exist by virtue of the illocutionary act underlying its enunciation."
Ladriere refers to the second aspect of performativity as institution. By institution, Ladriere means the effect whereby liturgical
language not only disposes individuals to welcome that which it
suggests, but, by the same means, institutes a community. In other
words, language is the location in which and the instrument by
means of which the community is constituted."
Ladriere considers the third aspect, presentification, to be the
most fundamental aspect of the performativity of liturgical language. He explains it this way: "By all those acts which it effects,
this language makes present for the participants, not as a spectacle, but as a reality whose efficacy they take into their very own
life, that about which it speaks and which it effects in diverse
ways. . . ."37

According to Ladriere, Christian liturgy, as ritual activity engaging language, produces this effect by means of repetition, proclamation, and sacramentality." By repetition, Ladriere means that
the liturgy repeats texts which announce events yet to occur or
which have already occurred in Jesus Christ. This repetition is not
a mere quotation of the past, but the resumption into speech acts
of today of words written or spoken in the past. In this way, by reforming the words which announce the mystery of salvation, the
community actively enters into that mystery.

"Ibid., 56.
"Ibid., 56-57.
"Ibid., 5&-59.
"Ibid., 5g-<jo.
38 Ibid., 60-61.
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For Ladriere, the confession of faith is the culmination of this
process of repetition. That is, it is an act of proclamation whose
illocutionary power is that of an attestation, ratification, and commitment. In declaring the mystery of salvation, it becomes active
and present."
Ladriere admits that linguistic analysis cannot suffice to explain
sacramental performativity. However, he points out that language
is a kind of structuring field which enables faith to express itself in
accordance with the exigencies of the reality to which it corresponds. 40
As a result of this three-fold performativity, therefore, liturgical
language expresses faith and awakens its fuU flowering in the
community constituted by its very expression and also in the individual. Thus it acts as a kind of structuring field which gives voice
to faith, echoes the Word made flesh, and becomes the location of
his presence."
Building on the work of Wheelock and Ladriere, Joseph SchaUer
points out that performative language theory is a helpful tool in
liturgical studies because it provides a method which examines the
relationship of meaning and text in the context of ritual. In addition,
the theory is pertinent to the study of liturgy because it views language more as doing" than simply communicating about a state of
affairs. Rather, a state of affairs is established in communicating."
By interpreting liturgical language as speech acts, SchaUer concludes that the act of pronouncing liturgical texts has the potential
to effectively change the existential situation of the participating
members of a community."
Because performative language theory focuses primarily on performative rather than propositional discourse, it can be successfuUy employed to interpret liturgical language as speech acts. By
using the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor outlined by Justin
London, it is possible to approach liturgical music-making as a
type of liturgical language. Thus, by using linguistic theory
H

Ibid., 60.
Ibid., 62.
41 Ibid.
39

40

41Joseph J. Schaller, "Performative Language Theory: An Exercise in the Analysis of Ritual:' Worship 62 (1988) 416.
43 Ibid.
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metaphoricaUy, it is possible to interpret liturgical music-making
as a performative speech act. Our next step is to investigate the
feasibility of such an interpretation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR LITURGICAL MUSIC

If, as is evident in the work of Wheelock, Ladriere, and SchaUer,
several principles of performative language theory can serve as
useful tools in investigating the nature of ritual language and its
function in the liturgy, these same principles should be able to be
applied to an investigation of the nature of ritual music, particularly ritual song. Those principles can be summarized as foUows:
1) that speaking an utterance can be the doing of something, since,
by virtue of its illocutionary force, language has the power to produce an intended effect, 2) that, because of its illocutionary force,
ritual language is situating rather than informing speech; and
3) that the meaningful components of a sentence include deep
syntactic structure and the stress and intonation contour of
its utterance.
Our intention is to employ these principles in an analysis of ritual singing. Reformulating them to apply to ritual song, they read
as foUows: 1) that ritual singing can be the doing of something,
since by virtue of its illocutionary force, ritual song has the power
to produce an intended effect, 2) that, because of its illocutionary
force, ritual music-making is situating rather than informing discourse; and 3) that the meaningful components of a song include
deep syntactic structure and the stress and intonation contour of
its utterance.
It is important to note that, just as liturgical theology understands symbol not as object but as activity, the focus of performative language theory is likewise not on language as object, but
language as activity. Austin's initial insight that the uttering of a
sentence can be the doing of something and Searle's point that it is
not the symbol or word, but the production of the symbol or word
that is the unit of linguistic communication indicate that it is the
activity of speaking itself that is their central concern. Therefore,
just as performative language theory does not focus on language
as an object, but as an activity of speaking, so, too, is our focus on
the act of music-making rather than on music as an object that can
be captured in a written score or in a recording.
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In developing a musical hermeneutic, Lawrence Kramer provides
a rationale for applying performative language theory to musical
processes when he says: "Any act of expression or representation
can exert iIIocutionary force provided, first, that the act is iterable
and, second, that in being produced the act seeks to affect a flow of
events, a developing situation. In their iIIocutionary dimension,
therefore, speech acts exemplify a larger category of expressive
acts through which iIIocutionary forces pass into general circulation. Musical processes clearly count as expressive acts according
to the terms just given. If we can learn to recognize them as such,
to concretize the iIIocutionary forces of music as we concretize its
harmonic, rhythmic, linear, and formal strategies, we can then go
on to interpret musical meaning."44
Based on the criteria Kramer gives for an act of expression to
exert iIIocutionary force, liturgical music-making possesses iIIocutionary force because it is an example of an iterable act which has
the potential to affect the flow of the liturgical event. Music-making
affects the flow of ritual particularly by means of the iIIocutionary
force indicators identified by John Searle, that is, stress and intonation contours. In terms of performative language theory, these illocutionary forces can serve as keys to interpreting musical meaning.
If we agree that it is possible to apply language theory to an
analysis of ritual music-making because Western culture often
approaches music from within linguistic frameworks, our next step
is to examine additional aspects of J. L. Austin's theory to discover
more specifically how music-making can be interpreted as a
speech act. Austin distinguishes five general categories of speech
acts: commissives, expositives, verdictives, exercitives, and behabitives.45 The first two, commissives and expositives, are dependent
on language because they require the use of tenses or propositional components. For this reason, Justin London points out, they
cannot be mapped onto music since music cannot fulfill the
requirements of tense and! or predication." Commissives are typified by promising. They commit a person to doing something. They
also include declarations of intention. Expositives, on the other
hand, indicate how our utterances fit into a conversation. They are
9.
1.50.
"London, 5&-57.

44 Kramer,

4S Austin,
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expository and can include such expressions as "I reply," and
HI concede."47
Verdictives, exercitives, and especially behabitives are less dependent on language and so offer the possibility of being expressed
as musical speech acts.4S Verdictives are typified by giving a verdict,
usually by someone in an official capacity such as an umpire, jury,
or priest. Similarly, exercitives are the giving of a decision either in
favor of or against a course of action."Thus, both verdictives and
exercitives require that these speech acts be uttered by someone
speaking in a specifically-defined institutional role, as, for example, speaker-as-umpire or speaker-as-priest. In Justin London's
judgment, musical gestures cannot be described in these terms because composers do not fulfill these institutional roles.50 However,
in the liturgy, worshipers and other ministers can take on specifically-defined institutional roles in the singing of certain ritual elements. Therefore, in the case of ritual music, musical speech acts
may have the potential to operate as verdictives and exercitives.
However, the fifth category, behabitives, appear to offer the
greatest potential for being mapped onto music. Austin describes
behabitives as a very miscellaneous group that have to do with
attitudes and soci£lZ behavior. Examples include apologizing, commending, thanking, and blessing.51
There are two reasons why behabitives offer the best possibility
for treating music gestures as speech acts. The first is that behabitives often involve little or no propositional content, and as the
coins of social exchange are usually produced in the present
tense, or in a tenseless fashion. The second is the fact that behabitives are strongly marked by intonation and other paralinguistic
features. In other words, behabitives involve those musical qualities of pitch, tone of voice, loudness, rhythm, and articulation
which specify the iIIocutionary act.52 These are the very features
which John Searle pointed out are among the iIIocutionary indicators in speech acts.
Austin,lSo-s1.
London, 56.
49 Austin, 152-54.
50 London, 57.
51 Austin, 151, 159.
52 London, 57.

47
48
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The use of stress and variation of voice pitch has always assisted
in the communication of meaning, even in spoken utterance.
Joseph Gelineau's comment on the role of musical elements in
ritual speech in pre-Christian and early Christian usage provides
an important insight: "As soon as speech turned to poetry, or when
public and ceremonial speaking was involved, rhythmic and
melodic features were incorporated which today would.be classified as musical or at least pre-musical. Music and singing could be
present even though none of the vocabulary associated with musical performance might be met with.""
In other words, the incorporation of rhythmic and melodic features is more likely to occur in situations which can be described
as ritual activity since such activity sets up a situation where
speech naturally moves toward an incorporation of musical elements. The result is the enhancement of the speech act by what
performative language theory calls the illocutionary force indicators of stress and intonation. Because music possesses these components, it is an important partner with language in the
communication of meaning.
Returning, then, to the three principles of performative language
theory outlined earlier, the next section will investigate when
singing can be said to be the doing of something in the particular
ritual called Christian liturgy.
FIRST PRINCIPLE: LITURGICAL SINGING AS DOING

Sacrosanctum Concilium states that the purpose of Christian liturgy

is twofold: the" glory of God and the sanctification of the faithful
(SC 10, 112). In light of J. L. Austin's performative language theory
we propose that singing within Christian liturgies can be described as "doing something" that in some way accomplishes one
or both of the purposes of the liturgy.
Like the category of speech acts which J. L. Austin calls behabitives, liturgical singing can be the speaking of attitudes. In other
words, singing draws the worshipers into the action of praying and
becomes the vehicle for speaking attitudes of prayer. As a result,
the action of singing is fundamentally confessional because, in the

context of the liturgy, it speaks or expresses faith in God and in the
possfuility of a relationship with God.
According to Ladriere's notion of existential induction, it is possible to say that the singing of such attitudes as praise, thanksgiving, contrition, and petition can awaken in the person singing" a
certain affective disposition which opens up existence to a specific
field of reality."" The effect which is produced, through the repetition of singing the attitude, is a gradual transformation whereby
the singer becomes a person who, for example, is thankful or contrite. When Don Saliers asserts that liturgical song has the power
of transformation by forming over time the imagination and affectivity of the Christian assembly, he is referring to the illocutionary
dimension of singing without using the term.55
In light of performative language theory, then, we can say that
singing such Christian attitudes of prayer is an act of prayer which
gives glory to God. In addition, by enabling participation in a
known and repeatable act, liturgical singing can bring about transformation, that is, the sanctification of the worshipers, by forming
them, over time, in those Christian dispositions which are expressed in the act of singing.
Furthermore, it is possible to say that understanding the language of the song is not always critical because, as Wheelock
points out, the most distinguishing feature of ritual utterances as
speech acts is that they convey little or no information. In the case
of liturgy, the ritual includes memorized sets of utterances or traditionally prescribed p'atterns that are known or accessible to the
worshipers before they engage in the prayer. The actual texts of
hymns, acclamations, or chants, normally do not convey information that the participants do not already know. This is because the
purpose in singing them is different from the purpose of ordinary
language utterances." Ritual communication is intimately connected with the action context of the ritual. The ritual is set in
motion by the interaction of a complexus of symbols such as
Scripture, icons, the music, the community of believers, and
postures of reverence or meditation which together accomplish the

53 Joseph Gelineau, #Music and Singing in the Liturgy," in The Study of the
Liturgy, ed. Cheslyn Jones, Geof£reyWainwright, and EdwardYamold (New York:

54 Ladriere, 56.
555ee Don Saliers, liThe Integrity of Sung Prayer/' Worship 55 (1981) 293·

Oxford University Press 1978) 444.

"Ibid., 58-59.
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purposes of the ritual: the glory of God and the transformation of
the assembly.
SECOND PRINCIPLE:
LITURGICAL SINGING AS SITUATING SPEECH

Wheelock's thesis that the language of ritual must be primarily
understood as situating rather than informing speech is especially·
pertinent to liturgical song. In performing ritual song, members of
the assembly create an acoustic space in which they become situated. The music which they make fills the space and surrounds
those who are present within it, thereby providing a sonic environment in which the assembly engages in prayer. Walter Ong describes the dynamics whereby singing situates an assembly when
he says: "Habits of auditory synthesis give rise to a special sense of
space itself. For besides visual-tactile space there is also acoustic
space (which, through voice and hearing, has its own associations
with the kinesthetic and tactual not quite the same as the kinesthetic and tactual associations of sight). We can apprehend space
in terms of sound and echoes. . . . Space thus apprehended has
qualities of its own. It is not spread out in front of us as a field of
vision but diffused around us. Sound. . . can be apprehended
from any direction, so that the hearer is situated [emphasis added]
in a center of an acoustic field.. not in front of it (so that it is indeed
hardly a field).""
This ability of music to situate worshipers in a sonic environment
provides an experience, not only of the worship space, but also of
the activity of music-making and of the worshiping assembly
engaged in that activity. It is in this way that singing as situating
speech creates and allows participation in the liturgy.
Such participation enables members of the assembly to become
a part of the whole. In this way, singing can situate the singers in a
community thus bonded by the activity of music-making. This
phenomenon corresponds to Ladriere's description of institution,
his term for the second aspect of performativity of liturgical language. Ladriere explains: "Language is not the expression of a
community constituted before it and apart from it and is not the

description of what such a community would be, but the location
(emphasis added) in which and the instrument by means of which
the community is constituted. In so far as it gives to all participants
- as co-locutors - the chance to take on the same acts, it establishes between them that operative reciprocity which constitutes
the reality of a community:'"
This community aspect is an essential element both in an understanding of language as a speech act and of an understanding of
ritual music. Just as language becomes the location and instrument
of community, so too, the making of the music is the means by
which the community is constituted.
Music-making embodies the experience of community by providing the assembly with a physical and psychological experience
of unity and harmony. Not only the sense of hearing and seeing,
but the intellect, emotions and the entire body are taken up into
the rhythms, melody, and harmony of the music. The music thus
mediates an embodied experience of that community or "People of
God." In no other experience of liturgical art can each individual
member of the assembly be so drawn into an awareness of and a
participation in the larger group.
This experience of community in many ways corresponds to
Victor Turner's notion of communitas, a key notion in his theory of
ritual as meaningful and transformative performance. Through
participation in the singing, worshipers experience a oneness
whereby distinctions of wealth, class, gender, race, and denomination can be suspended in favor of unity and harmony.59 In this way,
liturgical singing does more than communicate about a given state
of affairs. Rather, as Schaller has pointed out, a state of affairs is
established in communicating.60 Furthermore, it is this establishment of a "state of affairs" which creates and allows participation
in a known and repeatable situation.61
Lastly, liturgical music-making - that is, active involvement in
singing, playing, dancing, listening, or moving with the rhythms of
liturgical song - situates worshipers in the experience of the
58

59

Walter Ong,. The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History (New York: Simon and Schuster 1970) 163.
57
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already/not yet of ritual. This is possible because the situatioIJ thus
enacted in liturgy is idealized.62
THIRD PRINCIPLE:
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THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE INDICATORS

J. 1. Austin's five categories of speech acts provide for the possibility of mapping certain speech acts onto music, particularly music
which has the ability to express or "speak" attitudes and involve
such social behavior as apologizing, commending, thanking, and
blessing. These behabitives serve as "coins of social exchange" and
are strongly marked by such musical qualities as stress and intonation. That is - appropriately wedded to song texts - the pitch,
melodic contour, volume, and rhythm of the music serve even more
powerfully to produce the illocutionary effect. Often the most effective liturgical hymns, acclamations, and chants qualify as behabitives because, while they usually involve little or no propositional
content, they do speak such attitudes of prayer as praise, thanksgiving, contrition, petition, and confession which, exchanged among
the worshipers, produce the intended effect of praising, etc.
A musical analysis of Jacques Berthier's Taize chant, "Adoramus
Te Christe" is offered as an example of the role of the illocutionary
force indicators of stress and intonation contour in the wedding of
text and music in song.
The English translation of the Latin text reads as follows: "We
adore you, 0 Christ, and we bless you, because by your cross you
have redeemed the world." The parallelism and brevity of the first
two phrases provides a strong focus on the word "Christus"
(Christ), which is the object of both verbs, "adoramus" (adore) and
"benedicimus" (bless). The repetition of the same pitch and the
lowness of the pitch in each voice, provide a weightiness to both
phrases. The words, "adoramus te" (we adore you), are sung on the
lowest pitch of the song in each voice, a melodic device that parallels such gestures as kneeling or bowing. By contrast, the highest
pitches of the first two phrases are for singing the words "Christus" (Christ) and "tibi" (you) in reference to Christ, again a
possible melodic device for expressing Christ's exalted position as
Son of God.
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Fig. 1. "Adoramus Te Christe" 63
The syncopated rhythm of the third phrase relieves the heaviness of the first two phrases. The text, "quia per crucem tuam" (because by your cross), is set to a lilting phrase expressing an attitude
.
of joy and wonder without actually using those words.
The fourth phrase, "redemisti mundum" (you have redeemed
the world), begins on the lowest pitch of the melody line, the dominant note, and ends on the tonic. Underlying the melodic movement, there is a parallel harmonic movement from dominant to
tonic that creates a sense of rest or resolution. The third and fourth
phrases are repeated with each single performance of the complete ostinato. Thus, each time the assembly expresses adoration
and blessing, they repeat the reason twice.
63Jacques Berthier, Music from Taize, vol. 2, ed. Brother Robert, vocal edition,

62VVheelock, 105·

Judith Marie Kubicki

328

(Chicago: C.I.A. Publications, Inc. 1982) 2.

Ritual Music-Making

32 9

The linguistic and musical elements work together to express
the attitudes of adoration, blessing, faith, and gratitude. Furthermore, several means are employed to reinforce the illocutionary
force of the chant. For example, in each case, the verbs are placed
on the downbeat at the beginning of each new phrase." In addition,
the contour of the melody highlights the sense of the text and the
underlying attitude. Lastly, the choice of the minor key of f-sharp
minor, the use of repeated notes, and the low tessitura65 provide a
somberness which is balanced by the syncopated rhythm and the
ascent of the melodic line in three of the four phrases.
As in the case of the first two principles of performative language theory, the third principle regarding stress and intonation
contour is also influenced by context. This can include other songs,
prayers, Scripture readings, the visibility of sacred icons, lighting,
architecture, color, and incense. As these elements change or are
rearranged, the illocutionary power of the singing can also change.

ritual singing is a speech act which is capable of accomplishing an
action in the act of music-making.
Thus we can say that ritual singing is a means whereby the faithful may actively participate in the liturgy. Furthermore, we can say
that this interpretation can, by extension, apply to other modes of
ritual music-making - whether it be dancing or moving with the
rhythms of a song, playing musical instruments, humming, or
ululating - insofar as these actions enable worshipers "to accomplish" the ritual by means of the action of music-making. By thus
entering into liturgical music-making, worshipers enter into the
performance of the liturgy and thus open themselves to the possibility of accomplishing its purposes: the praise and glory of God
and their own transformation or sanctification.

Maxwell E.Johnson
J. L. Austin's performative language theory is a useful tool for
describing the dynamics involved in ritual music-making since it
allows us to describe liturgical singing as an instance when singing
is the doing of something. What is accomplished in the singing is the
speaking of attitudes which, because of its illocutionary power can,
over time, bring about the transformation of those who participate
in the liturgy, even as the participants perform the act of worshiping God. Furthermore, performative language theory provides a
framework for explaining how music situates the assembly in a
sonic environment which draws worshipers into its movement,
enabling participation in a known and repeatable act of worship
within an "acoustic space." Lastly, performative language theory
allows us to identify the musical elements of stress and intonation
contour as the illocutionary force indicators which give the singing
the power to effect what is being sung. As a result, we can say that
&4 In the case of #Adoramus te Christe/ the Latin verb comes first and is sung
on the strong beat, that is the downbeat. In English, the pronoun would come
first, thereby moving the verb to a weak beat.
65 Tessitura is a musical term used to describe the range of a vocal compass in
which most of a piece is located. It does not include the total range of the piece.
So, for example, one may say the tessitura of the soprano was either low or high,
depending on where in the range the voice most consistently sang.
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The 1998 Libra de Liturgia y Cantiea of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America:
An Evaluation of its Seeci6n de Liturgia
Published in 1998, after four years of detailed work, debate, and
compromise, Spanish-speaking clergy, members, and congregations of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) in the
United States, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere now have their own version of the Lutheran Book of Worship (LBW), containing in Spanish
the complete liturgical-sacramental rites of the Church as well as a
comprehensive hymnal reflecting a wide Hispanic-LatinoJa musical diversity. Prior to the appearance of this significant Libro de
Liturgia y Cantico (hereafter, Libro),' Spanish-speaking Lutherans
were dependent for liturgical texts, liturgical music, and hymnic
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